Abstract Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes can be used to enforce access control policies by cryptographic means. In this paper, we present a new, enhanced security model for such schemes. We also give simple, efficient, and strongly-secure constructions for Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes for arbitrary hierarchies using pseudorandom functions and forward-secure pseudorandom generators. We compare instantiations of our constructions with state-of-the-art Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes, demonstrating that our new schemes possess an attractive trade-off between storage requirements and efficiency of key derivation.
Introduction
Access control: There are numerous examples where it is desirable to provide differentiated access to data according to an access control policy. As an illustration, consider a hospital where doctors are assigned access permission to a set of files containing some personal information in a patient's medical record, depending on their seniority, while nurses, being at a lower level in the hierarchy, have more restricted access to that information. As another example, consider a building management scenario where sensors are installed to capture temperature, humidity, light, motion, sound, or other data. These data have different levels of sensitivity, and access to information of different types might be restricted to different personnel, depending on their roles in the organization. Normal employees would only be able, for example, to access temperature, humidity and light of the floor where they work, while managers of that floor would be able to have access to information related to presence in rooms on that floor, like motion and sound data. The manager of the building would, however, have access to all information for the different floors of the building. As a third example, broadcasters wish to control access to broadcast services in such a way that only paying customers can access the programmes included in the package to which they have subscribed, and nothing else. Other application domains include management of databases containing sensitive information, military and government communication, and protection of industrial secrets. Indeed the field of access control is a healthy sub-discipline of Information Security in its own right.
Cryptographic enforcement: The use of cryptographic techniques to enforce access control policies for hierarchical structures was first proposed in 1983, by Akl and Taylor [1] , who put forward the concept of a (hierarchical) key assignment scheme (KAS) . Such a scheme is a method to assign some private information and encryption keys to each class in a hierarchy in such a way that the private information assigned to a class, along with some public information, can be used to derive symmetric encryption keys assigned to all classes lower down in the hierarchy. Formally, the hierarchy is modelled as a partially ordered set (poset) , each data item is labelled by a class u in the hierarchy, and is encrypted using the encryption key k u corresponding to that class. Now a user, given access to the private information S u , can derive the relevant encryption key k v for any descendant class v, and hence gain access to the data of class v. Since the original paper by Akl and Taylor, a large number of different schemes have been proposed, offering different trade-offs in terms of the amount of public and private storage required and the complexity of key derivation -see for example [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Many additional issues are addressed in these works: time-dependent constraints, dynamic addition and removal of classes, and revocation, for example. A recent survey of this area by Crampton et al. [18] provides a detailed classification and analyses of many of the schemes proposed in the last decades.
Many of the early schemes lacked any formal security analysis, but this shortcoming has been gradually addressed beginning with the work of Atallah et al. [8] , who proposed two different security notions: security against key recovery attacks (KR-security) and security with respect to key indistinguishability (KI-security). Informally, KR-security captures the notion that an adversary should not be able to compute a key to which it should not have access; whereas in the notion of KI-security, the adversary should not even be able to distinguish between the real key and a random string of the same length. The stronger KIsecurity notion is important in enabling secure composability for hierarchical key assignment schemes, that is, in achieving the property that any secure key assignment scheme can be safely used alongside any suitably secure encryption scheme.
Our contributions:
We first argue that the KI-security notion introduced in [8] needs to be strengthened in order to capture the widest possible range of realistic attacks. In particular, the current model does not allow an adversary to gain access to encryption keys k v for classes above the target class u, even though these encryption keys might leak through usage and their compromise need not directly lead to a compromise of the private information S u or encryption key k u for the target class. We then define a model that provides this additional compromise capability to the adversary, and show that our new model is strictly stronger than the existing KI-security notion. Section 2 contains the details.
We next propose two very simple and efficient hierarchical key assignment schemes for arbitrary posets, and prove them to be secure in the sense of our strengthened security notion. Both of our schemes exploit the chain partition idea recently introduced by Crampton et al. [15] . This gives a method of constructing a KAS for an arbitrary access structure (modelled as a poset), represented by a directed acyclic graph P = (V, E), from a KAS for a simple chain (i.e. a KAS for a totally ordered set) by partitioning the poset into chains and building the keys for the more complex scheme for P in a particular way from the keys of the simpler chain KAS. This approach has the nice property that the amount of private storage needed per class is bounded by the width of the poset P . This approach was proposed without any formal security analysis in [15] , and analysed in some specific cases in [16] . We provide in Section 3 a generic security analysis of this approach, showing that the security of the resulting scheme for P = (V, E) in our strengthened model is equivalent to the security (also in our strengthened model) for the chain scheme. It is worth noting that this construction can support different levels of security or efficiency of key derivation for different subgroups in a hierarchy, by using different schemes in each chain.
This construction enables us to focus on constructing efficient KAS for chain posets in our strengthened model. Our first construction in Section 4 is based only on pseudorandom functions (PRFs), which can be efficiently implemented using, for example, HMAC [19] built using only a cryptographic hash function, or by using an iterated version of the simple and efficient factoring-based construction proposed by Naor and Reingold [20] (wherein the evaluation of the function at a given point is comparable in cost to two modular exponentiations). When implemented in the latter way, our scheme enjoys provable security based on one of the most established concrete intractability assumption used in cryptography, namely the factoring assumption.
Our second construction, in Section 5, is based on any forward-secure pseudorandom generator (FS-PRG). This construction is a generalization and a strengthening of the construction for chains given in [16] , which implicitly makes use of the known forward-security of the BBS PRG [21] in order to achieve KI-security. Note that the BBS generator was not originally presented as a stateful generator and its forward-security property was first used in the BlumGoldwasser cryptosystem [22] and later by Bellare and Yee [23] . An FS-PRG can be obtained cheaply and generically from any PRG using the constructions of Bellare and Yee [23] ; moreover a PRG can be easily obtained from a PRF. Thus our second scheme can be instantiated in a variety of ways.
In the full version of this paper [24] , we provide a detailed comparison of instantiations of our new constructions with a variety of proven-secure KAS from the literature.
Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes

Basic Definitions
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (V, ≤) where V is a finite set of pairwise disjoint classes, called security classes, and '≤' is a partial order on V , i.e. is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation. A security class can represent a person, a department, or a user group in an organisation. Relation ≤ is defined in accordance with authority for each class in V : for any two classes u, v ∈ V we write v ≤ u or u ≥ v to indicate that users in class u can access the data of users in class v. We say that u covers v, denoted v u or u v, if v < u and there does not exist c ∈ V such that v < c < u. 
The problem that we address consists of assigning keys (e.g., to be used in a symmetric encryption scheme) to each class in a poset in such a way that it should be possible to efficiently derive the keys for any descendant class in the poset. The cryptographic primitive that solves this challenge is called a hierarchical key assignment scheme [1] , and is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Key Assignment Scheme).
Let Γ denote a set of access graphs, i.e. of graphs that correspond to posets. A hierarchical key assignment scheme (KAS) for Γ is a pair of algorithms (Gen, Derive) satisfying the following conditions:
G) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1 ρ and a graph G = (V, E) ∈ Γ and outputs (a) for all classes u ∈ V : private information S u and key
, for a fixed polynomial p; (b) public information pub. We denote by (S, k, pub) the output of Gen(1 ρ , G), where S = (S u ) u∈V and k = (k u ) u∈V are the vectors of private information and keys, respectively.
Derive(G, u, v, S u , pub) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a graph G, classes u, v ∈ V such that v ≤ u, private information S u , and public information pub, and outputs a key k ∈ {0, 1} p(ρ)
assigned to class v.
Correctness requires that for all
ρ ∈ N, all G ∈ Γ , all (S, k, pub) output by Gen(1 ρ , G), and all u, v ∈ V, v ≤ u: Derive(G, u, v, S u , pub) = k v .
Security of Key Assignment Schemes
Various informal security models for key assignment schemes have been developed and proposed in the past. Formal security modelling began with [8] . However, as we will argue, all these models -both formal and informal -are inadequate for practical application in the most challenging of security environments. In the following, we first describe our new, strengthened models, and discuss the differences to the established ones.
We consider variants of the key indistinguishability (KI) security goal proposed by Atallah et al. in [8] . We consider models with both static and dynamic adversaries. It will shortly become clear, however, that these two models are polynomially equivalent. We begin with an informal statement of our security models, and then give a formal model in terms of a security experiment involving an adversary.
Static adversaries A stat , upon given an access graph G = (V, E), first choose a security class u ∈ V to attack. Using Gen algorithm on graph G, the experiment generates (S, k, pub). The adversary is then provided with private information S v assigned to all classes v ∈ V that should not enable the computation of key k u , along with the set of all keys k v associated to classes v ∈ V such that v > u, and the public information pub. Precisely, the adversary gets pub and the two sets Corrupt G,S,u and Keys G,u , where we define
Notice that, given Corrupt G,S,u , the adversary can compute for himself all keys k v for v ∈ Corrupt G,S,u . As a challenge, the adversary additionally gets either key k u or a random string of the same length, and it has to distinguish these two cases. We refer to Definition 2 below for the formal specification of this experiment. Observe that, from the obtained information, the adversary can gain access to k v for any v ∈ V \ {u}. In contrast to static adversaries, dynamic (also called adaptive) adversaries A dyn may request keys k v and secret information S v in an adaptive manner before eventually committing to a security class u ∈ V they want to attack. After receiving a challenge based on key k u , they continue to request keys and secret information until terminating and outputting a bit. The adversary wins in the experiment if it successfully distinguishes the key k u from random, under the restriction that u ≤ v for all classes v in the corrupted set and that key k u has not been requested.
It is not difficult to see that the static and dynamic models are actually polynomially equivalent. Indeed, in the corresponding reduction, the static adversary simply guesses which class will be the subject of the dynamic adversary's query, and aborts if the guess turns out to be incorrect; this reduction succeeds with probability 1/|V |. A similar proof was used in [9] (and implicitly in [8] ). So schemes proven secure against static adversaries are automatically also secure against dynamic adversaries (albeit with a less tight overall security reduction). In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the static case.
We next give our definition for security in the sense of strong key indistinguishability with respect to static adversaries (S-KI-ST-security), formalising the above discussion.
Definition 2 (S-KI-ST).
Let Γ be a set of access graphs and let (Gen, Derive) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ . Consider the following experiment (where we assume that adversary A keeps state between invocations):
For any G ∈ Γ , the advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
Note that if we write Exp
, for the modification of
where bit β is fixed to β = γ, we have that
The key assignment scheme is said to be secure in the sense of strong key indistinguishability with respect to static adversaries (S-KI-ST-secure) if Adv
is negligible for every efficient adversary A and any graph G ∈ Γ .
It will be evident that one can also define an S-KR-ST-security notion, in which the adversary is required to recover the key k u rather than distinguish it from a random key. Clearly S-KI-ST-security implies S-KR-ST security.
We now explain why our model is stronger than the one introduced by Atallah et al. [8] that it is based on. While our S-KI-ST adversary receives both the set Corrupt G,S,u ⊆ S of secret information and the set Keys G,u ⊆ {0, 1} p(ρ) of computed (symmetric) keys, in the model from [8] the adversary receives only the former set when performing its attack. In the dynamic setting, our strong adversary has access to keys k v for which v > u, where u is the challenge security class, whereas in the dynamic model of [8] , the adversary has no access to such keys. Now in a real deployment of a scheme, some of the cryptographic keys k v used in the scheme may leak, perhaps through cryptanalysis or misuse. In this case, we would like our selected security model to provide the strongest possible guarantees about the security of other keys that have not been leaked. But note that the previous security model from [8] provides no such guarantees, whereas our model provides the strongest possible guarantee, in that all keys k v with v > u are given to the adversary. Indeed, as the next example makes clear, it is quite feasible that leakage of a key k v for which v > u can damage the security of the key k u .
A separating example: Consider a graph (V, E) having linear structure, i.e. V = {v 0 , . . . , v n−1 } with v i+1 v i for all i. Let H be a one-way function, which we model as a random oracle. We select S v0 at random from the domain of H and set k vi = S vi and S vi+1 = H(S vi ) for all i. It is clear how the Gen and Derive algorithms should be defined, and that the resulting scheme is correct. It is also easy to see that the scheme is KR-ST-secure in the random oracle model, in the sense of [8] . However, it is also clear that with knowledge of key S v0 , all keys S v in the hierarchy can be efficiently determined (including challenge key k u ) and hence the scheme is insecure in the S-KR-ST model. We note that this separation is for key recovery (KR) security notions.
Security Analysis of the Chain Partition Construction
We begin by reviewing the Chain Partition Construction for key assignment schemes from [15] . Given a partially ordered set (V, ≤), represented by the directed acyclic graph P = (V, E), Dilworth's Theorem [25] asserts that every partially ordered set (V, ≤) can be partitioned into w chains, where w is the width of V , that is, the cardinality of the largest antichain in V . The partition need not be unique. We select a particular partition of V into chains {C 0 , . . . , C w−1 }. The length of C i is denoted by l i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ w − 1. We let l max denote max i {l i }. The maximum class of C i is regarded as the first class in C i and the minimum class as the last class. Since {C 0 , . . . , C w−1 } is a partition of V , each u ∈ V belongs to precisely one chain.
Let C = u 0 . . . u m be any chain in V . Then any chain of the form u j . . . u m , 0 < j ≤ m is said to be a suffix of C. Now, for any u ∈ V , the set ↓ u := {v ∈ V : v ≤ u} has non-empty intersection with one or more chains C 0 , . . . , C w−1 . It is proved in [15] that the intersection of ↓ u and the chain C i is a suffix of C i or the empty set. Following, [15] , this will enable us to define the private information that should be given to a user with label u.
Since {C 0 , . . . , C w−1 } is a partition of V into chains, {↓ u∩C 0 , . . ., ↓ u∩C w−1 } is a disjoint collection of chain suffixes. Additionally, the private information for each class in V should be chosen so that the private information for the j-th class of a chain can be used to compute keys for all lower classes in that chain. Hence, we can see that a user with label u should be given the private information for the maximal classes in the non-empty suffixes ↓ u ∩ C 0 , . . . , ↓ u ∩ C w−1 . Given u ∈ V , letû 0 , . . . ,û w−1 denote these maximal classes, with the convention that Additionally, let X = (Gen X , Derive X ) be a KAS scheme for the set consisting of a single chain of length exactly l max . Then the chain partition scheme KAS CP (X, P ) = (Gen CP , Derive CP ) (relative to the particular partition selected) is defined as follows.
Algorithm Gen CP (1 ρ , P ): 
}. We stress here that we could run different algorithms Gen X to produce the different chains of lengths l i , but for ease of notation we will assume they are all the same. 
Set k u
g h ← Derive X (C g , u g r , u g h , T u g r , pub g ). 3. Output k u g h .
Theorem 1 (S-KI-ST Security of the Chain Partition Construction).
Let P be a directed acyclic graph and X be an S-KI-ST-secure scheme for single chains. Then scheme KAS CP (X, P ) = (Gen CP , Derive CP ) obtained from the chain partition construction is also S-KI-ST-secure.
Proof. Assume A CP attacks a class u i j of graph P . If A CP is able to distinguish between the real key k u i j associated with class u i j , and a random string having the same length, we show that we can construct an S-KI-ST adversary A X against the scheme X that, using A CP as a black box, is able to distinguish between real or random keys. Algorithm A X plays the S-KI-ST security game described in Definition 2, receiving as initial input a security parameter 1 ρ and a chain on l max classes. Adversary A X simulates the environment of A CP in such a way that A CP 's view is indistinguishable from its view when playing the S-KI-ST security game. to obtain (S t , k t , pub t ), the set of secret information, the set of keys and the public information for that chain. Note that, as in the construction, these sets can be truncated to obtain the set of secret information, the set of keys and the public information for a chain of length exactly l t . By abuse of notation, we continue to use (S t , k t , pub t ) to denote this data. 4. Output v j in chain C as A X 's choice of target class. A X now receives as input the public information, pub, output by Gen X , along with secret information S vt for all classes v t < v j in C, and all secret keys k vt in C such that v t > v j . A X also receives as input a value T which is either the real key k vj or a random key of the same length. In what follows, A X will identify the first l i classes in C with the chain C i in the chain partition construction. 5. Set pub CP = (pub 0 , . . . , pub i−1 , pub, pub i+1 , . . . , pub w−1 ) . Use the secret information S vt for classes v t < v j in C together with the secret information in the sets S t for 0 ≤ t ≤ w − 1, t = i to build the set Corrupt P,S,u . Use keys k vt in C such that v t > v j and the keys from the sets k t to build the set Keys P,u . 6. Run A CP with inputs (pub CP , Corrupt P,S,u , Keys P,u , T ). It is easy to see that A X has the information required to properly construct the sets Corrupt P,S,u , Keys P,u in such a way that A CP 's input here is valid in A CP 's experiment against the scheme KAS CP (X, P ), and such that T is the real key (resp. the random key) in A CP 's experiment if and only if T is the real key (resp. the random key) in A X 's experiment. 7. When A CP outputs a bit, output the same bit. Now as A X 's simulation is perfect, we see that the advantage of A X in winning its S-KI-ST indistinguishability game for the chain C of length l max is the same as the advantage of A CP in playing the S-KI-ST indistinguishability game against KAS CP (X, P ). The theorem now follows.
Note that, in the above theorem, X need only be an S-KI-ST-secure scheme for chains of length exactly l max . Because of the truncation trick, this is equivalent to X being an S-KI-ST-secure scheme for the set of graphs consisting of chains of lengths up to l max .
A Scheme Based on PRFs
We construct an S-KI-ST-secure key assignment scheme for totally-ordered hierarchical access structures of arbitrary depth, based on pseudorandom functions. By combining our construction with the result from Section 3, a general key assignment scheme for arbitrary posets is obtained.
We admit that also Atallah et al. [8] give an efficient PRF-based construction for arbitrary posets. However, their construction achieves only a security notion called 'key recovery' (where an adversary attacking a class u has to compute the challenge key k u , instead of distinguishing it from random), which is weaker than our S-KI-ST notion. Moreover, our scheme is much simpler, and requires no public information to be stored.
We start by recalling the definition of a PRF, the central building block of our construction: 
The advantage of A F is defined as In our following construction, we will use special PRFs where K = R = {0, 1} ρ for security parameter ρ, and D is any set. We remark that some constructions in [8] also require PRFs with similar restrictions on keyspace and range. For concreteness, we propose to deploy the (hash-based) HMAC primitive [19] as a PRF (see also analysis in [26] ). In addition, it might be possible to find suitable constructions based on number-theoretic assumptions, e.g. derived from factoringbased PRF by Naor and Reingold [20] , or the PRF obtained by converting the BBS [21] PRG into a PRF via the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction [27] .
We say that F is pseudorandom (or: is a PRF) if Adv
A PRF-Based Key Assignment Scheme for Totally Ordered Hierarchies
We briefly recall the setting of key assignment for chains. Let Γ be the family of graphs corresponding to totally ordered hierarchies, and let G = (V, E) ∈ Γ be a graph, where V = {u 0 , . . . , u n−1 } for some n, and u i+1 u i for all i. To each security class u i ∈ V , private information S i and key k i are assigned, where S i can be used to compute subordinated keys. Here we abuse notation, for better exposition (we can do this because we are in the linear setting), writing S i for S ui and k i for k ui .
Let ρ be a security parameter and let F : {0, 1} ρ × D → {0, 1} ρ be a PRF. Let c 0 and c 1 be two different elements in D. The Gen and Derive algorithms work as follows.
Algorithm Gen(1 ρ , G):
, and pub ← ∅. 4. Output (S, k, pub) .
Observe that computing key k j from secret information S i requires exactly j − i + 1 evaluations of the underlying PRF.
The following theorem is proven in the full version of this paper [24] . 
Theorem 2 (S-KI-ST Security of the PRF-based Scheme for Totally Ordered Hierarchies
A Scheme Based on Forward-Secure PRGs
FS-PRGs, introduced by Bellare and Yee in [23] , are stateful/iterated pseudorandom generators (PRGs) that deterministically derive sequences of fixed-length bit strings from an initial (random) seed. More precisely, in each iteration they output a string of bits, update their internal state, and securely erase the old state. Like in regular PRGs, the output sequences are required to be indistinguishable from sequences of random strings. The pivotal property of FS-PRGs is forward security, i.e. the adversary has the ability to eventually corrupt generator's internal state, but indistinguishability of output strings is guaranteed to still hold up to that point. In this section, building on generic FS-PRGs, we construct a key assignment scheme which achieves S-KI-ST security for totally-ordered access graphs and, in combination with the results from Section 3, for arbitrary posets. It is worth pointing out that we actually widely generalize the construction from [16] , which implicitly exploits the property of forward security of the BBS pseudorandom generator. As our construction generically builds on FS-PRGs, it is amenable to the efficiency gain obtained by replacing the BBS-based FS-PRG by, for instance, an HMAC-based one.
Before describing our scheme, let us first recall the definition and security notion of forward-secure pseudorandom number generators (FS-PRGs). Observe that we slightly weaken the model from [23] (considering static adversaries instead of adaptive ones), what renders our construction of a key assignment scheme more general. Clearly the FS-PRG constructions proposed and proved secure in [23] naturally remain secure in our adapted model. Forward-Secure PRG) . Let G FS = (G FS .setup, G 
Definition 4 (
We say that G FS is a forward-secure pseudorandom number generator (FS-PRG) if Adv
FS−PRG D,GFS
(ρ) is negligible for every efficient adversary D.
The FS-PRG-Based Scheme for a Single Chain
Key assignment schemes for totally-ordered access graphs are readily constructed from FS-PRGs: In our construction, we identify the FS-PRG's state St i with the private information S i stored for class u i , while key k i is set to the FS-PRG's output Out i+1 . More precisely, let Γ be the family of graphs corresponding to totally ordered hierarchies, let G = (V, E) ∈ Γ be a graph, where V = {u 0 , . . . , u n−1 } for some n, and u i+1 u i for all i. As in Section 4.1, we write S i for private information S ui , and k i for key k ui . Let ρ be a security parameter, and let G FS = (G FS .setup, G FS .key, G FS .next) be an FS-PRG. Then Gen and Derive algorithms work as follows. The following theorem is proven in the full version of this paper [24] . 
Theorem 3 (S-KI-ST Security of the FS-PRG-based Scheme for Totally Ordered Hierarchies
